(Download) "Measuring the Effects of Specialization with Circuit Split Resolutions." by Stanford Law School # eBook PDF Kindle ePub Free
eBook details
- Title: Measuring the Effects of Specialization with Circuit Split Resolutions.
- Author : Stanford Law School
- Release Date : January 01, 2011
- Genre: Law,Books,Professional & Technical,
- Pages : * pages
- Size : 410 KB
Description
INTRODUCTION Suggestions for a specialized judiciary are a lightning rod in legal academia, apt to attract passionate defenses of the idealized "generalist judge." But the dichotomy of specialist versus generalist judges is a false one. In fact, all judges specialize to some extent thanks to variety in the subject matters of their cases. Within the regional federal courts of appeals ("circuits"), the Second Circuit is known for securities law, the Fifth for immigration law, and the D.C. for administrative law. By recognizing that judicial specialization by subject matter is not binary but instead lies along a continuum, this Note aims to test empirically the predicted benefits of specialization. In particular, this Note examines whether partial specialization improves judicial performance. A court partially specializes when it decides more cases than other courts in a particular subject matter and gains a relative advantage in deciding that kind of case. A court partially specializes relative to other courts: the Second Circuit partially specializes in securities law because it handles more securities cases than the other federal courts of appeals, but it has not fully specialized because it also hears nonsecurities cases. Partial specialization is about load relative to other courts; full specialization, on the other hand, is about narrowed subject matter jurisdiction of a specific court. So partial specialization, unlike full specialization, requires a comparison group. Economists have long concluded that full specialization leads to better performance. This conclusion should apply to partial specialization as well. But empirically testing these benefits for courts runs into an immediate problem: how does one assess when a court performs "better"?